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I. INTRODUCTION
Few constitutional law issues have generated as much controversy over
the past two decades as those involving due process hearing requirements.
The Supreme Court has at times, particularly under the influence of now
Chief Justice Rehnquist, been reluctant to add procedural requirements be-
yond those clearly and expressly imposed by statutory language. This ap-
proach has, however, now fallen almost completely out of favor with the
members of the Court and with most academic critics.
This Article reinterprets and expands upon the basic Rehnquist ap-
proach by means of standard contract law analysis. While some due process
contexts, such as those involving claims of prisoners, welfare recipients, or,
arguably, public school students, are, at best, no more easily resolved
through a contract law analysis, other, at least equally important and fre-
quently litigated cases, including those involving the procedural rights of
college students and government employees, are most easily and convinc-
ingly resolved along lines suggested by the private law of contracts and con-
tract defenses.
The context chosen to illustrate this process herein will be that of gov-
ernment employees who have, against their wishes, been dismissed from
their positions. The typical result of such an analysis, it will be found, will,
with some exceptions, be more nearly in accord with the results of the
Rehnquist approach than with those of the current Court majority. A con-
tractual approach to due process thus provides a simple, broad critique of
contemporary procedural due process doctrine.
II. THE REHNQUIST ANALYSIS
Justice Rehnquist's initial analysis in the due process case of Arnet v.
Kennedy, to which he continues to adhere, has recently been concisely sum-
marized by Justice Rehnquist himself, dissenting in Cleveland Board of
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Education v. Loudermill,1 and by the Court majority in the same case.2
The Rehnquist analysis and the current majority analysis share certain
elements. Held in common is the view that the claim of due process viola-
tion depends upon a showing by the employee of a property right in contin-
ued employment, where that property right or interest was created and de-
fined by some source independent of the Constitution, 3 such as state statute,
regulation, common law, or contract between the parties.
The Rehnquist and the majority approaches part company, however,
over the status of the argument that the scope and definition of the property
right or interest is determined not merely by the narrowly substantive
granting language, but by any clearly expressed relevant language of pro-
cess or procedure in terminating or revoking the more narrowly substantive
entitlement, where the specified procedures were adhered to by the em-
ployer in the given case."
The Rehnquist approach asserts the impropriety of severing the nar-
rowly substantive language of rights from the explicit procedural language
clearly governing termination of the substantive interest conferred by the
statute. In the famous phrase, the Rehnquist approach concludes that"where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the
limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that
right, a [claimant] must take the bitter with the sweet."15
The essential logic of the Rehnquist position is that the courts should
in this instance, at least prima facie, uphold and give effect to a clear legis-
lative compromise,' in the absence of any reason to assume that Congress
or a state legislature must, as a constitutional matter, be put to a choice
between not conferring at all a right that might not otherwise exist, and
conferring it with greater procedural protection than Congress or the state
legislature thought appropriate.7
In his dissenting opinion in Loudermill, Justice Rehnquist quoted ex-
tensively from his opinion for the plurality in Arnett. His view was that
"'[o]nly by bifurcating the very sentence of the Act of Congress which con-
ferred upon [the employee] the right not to be removed save for cause could
I. 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1502 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 1492.
3. Id. at 1491 (quoting the Court's own original formulation of this approach in Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
4. Compare 105 S. Ct. at 1492-93 (current, majority approach) with id. at 1502-03
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
5. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974)(plurality opinion) quoted in
Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. at 1492.
6. 416 U.S. at 154 (plurality opinion).
7. Id.
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it be said that he had an expectancy of that substantive right without the
procedural limitations which Congress attached to it."8 In Arnett, "the very
section" of the right-granting statute "expressly provided also for the proce-
dure by which 'cause' [for employee termination] was to be determined." 9
Crucial to the Rehnquist analysis, then, is simultaneous conferral of a
substantive right and enforceability limitations, where the legislature's in-
tent as to the latter is found to be as conscientious and explicit as to the
former. Justice Rehnquist continues to believe, then, that for due process
purposes, statutory rights of employees need not be simply granted in the
abstract. As he concluded in Loudermill:
We ought to recognize the totality of the State's definition of the
property right in question, and not merely seize upon one of sev-
eral paragraphs in a unitary statute to proclaim that in that par-
agraph the State has inexorably conferred upon a civil service
employee something which it is powerless under the United
States Constitution to qualify in the next paragraph of the
statute.10
While Justice Rehnquist's approach is often discussed in terms of an
"inextricable intertwining"1 of the presumed substance or substantive
grant and the annexed procedural limitations or requirements, the meta-
phor of intertwining plainly adds nothing to his analysis. The basic require-
ment on the Rehnquist analysis is simply that the legislature "paid close
attention to"12 the procedures imposed and that the procedural protections
expressly attach or refer to the more narrowly substantive statutory entitle-
ment. 3 That the procedural and more narrowly substantive language were
physically close to each other is generally immaterial.
As a final preliminary matter, it is irrelevant for our purposes whether
one views the Rehnquist analysis in Arnett as concluding that no property
interest was taken, or that the only property interests taken were taken with
due process. 4 Our more explicitly contractual reinterpretation and develop-
8. 105 S. Ct. at 1502 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(quoting Arnett, 416 U.S. at 152 (plu-
rality opinion)).
9. 105 S. Ct. at 1502 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(quoting Arnett, 416 U.S. at 152 (plu-
rality opinion)).
10. 105 S. Ct. at 1503 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
II. See supra text accompanying note 5.
12. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry,
71 CALIF. L. REv. 146, 154 (1983).
13. See Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward A More Responsive Ap-
proach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. Iii, 130 (1978).
14. See Terrell, "Property" "Due Process," and the Distinction Between Definition and
Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEo. L.J. 861, 889 n.152 (1982)(in a sense, no deprivation of
anything); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property".- Adjudicative Due Process in the
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ment of the Rehnquist approach, and the limitations of that approach,
should be essentially the same under either view.
III. CONTRACTUALISM IN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
Reflecting on the Court's treatment of procedural due process cases,
Professor Tribe has maintained that the cases at least up until recently may
be best understood on a theory of the judicial role of "enforcing, according
to their terms, the commands of the sovereign."'" A command-of-the-sover-
eign approach, however, tends to exaggerate any elements of arbitrariness
and imperiousness, democratic or otherwise, present within the system of
due process.
In contrast, this paper's contractualist reinterpretation and elaboration
of the Rehnquist approach both better displays its ability to withstand the
familiar criticisms of the Rehnquist approach, and exposes more clearly its
inherent, unavoidable limitations.
At the outset, confusion must be avoided as to whom the parties to the
contract are taken to be. On the theory developed in this Article, the rele-
vant contract is not assumed to be between the legislators on the one hand
and their various supporters, political or financial, or lobbyists, or compet-
ing interest groups on the other." Nor will our focus be solely on govern-
ment employees as burdened or benefitted under a statute, a view ascribed
to Justice Rehnquist. 17
Instead, our focus will be on the presumed interaction or mutual ex-
pression of preferences and priorities, as mediated by the legislature, of
both employer and employee groups, who are assumed to have both com-
mon and conflicting interests. The contractual model eleborated at the
group level is supplemented and reinforced by any contractual relationship
developed at the level of the particular, individual employee and his
employer.
We are already moving in the direction of contractual analysis when
we recognize that "private groups often have an important role in drafting
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 463 (1977) (limited vested property right
not threatened by government's action); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 COR-
NELL L. REV. 405, 437 (1977)("all nine Justices agreed that the employee had a sufficient
property interest to trigger due process scrutiny").
15. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 269, 277 n.24
(1975).
16. Cf. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpre-
tation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 231 n.42 (1986).
17. See Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and
Perry, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 146, 177 (1983).
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statutes." 8 Obviously, the influence of one group does not necessarily ex-
clude the influence in reponse of a partially antagonistic group. It is this
resolution of interest group forces, or their interaction, that may embody, to
greater or lesser degree, some or all of the elements of an ordinary contract,
agreement, or understanding, and that gives rise to a legislative"compromise."1 9
Admittedly, the concept of a legislative "compromise"" is ambiguous.
It may suggest no more than a legislator or group of legislators actively
seizing the initiative and authoritatively resolving an irreconcilable dispute
between private groups by simply splitting the differences according to their
own lights. "Compromise" may, on the other hand, reflect or partake of
negotiation or bargaining among some or all directly affected parties or in-
terest groups. This latter sense of "compromise," in which the elements of
an ordinary contract tend to loom larger, is suggested by the view of law-
making as resulting in "a series of accomodations.21
We need not assume, for purposes of our contractual analysis, that any
given instance of statutory lawmaking generating a procedural due process
inquiry need rise to the level of a technically pure and unassailably com-
plete and enforceable private contract between the directly affected parties,
the government employer and the government employees or union or their
agents. The crucial point is that to the degree that a given set of circum-
stances or transactions approaches, resembles, or partakes of the nature of a
contract, contract law to that degree, all else equal, supplies normative
force to the legislative arrangement. To the degree that a contract analysis
supplies normative force, at least prima facie, the natural inference will be
that one should most appropriately look to the standard sorts of contract
law defenses, excuses, and justifications if one wishes to avoid or modify the
application of the legislatively-enshrined "contract."
While it is certainly possible to deprecate a particular statute as the
product of an "interest-group deal," the very notion of a "deal," or of bar-
gaining, should "give rise to a heavy presumption of enforceability.""2 It is
certainly plausible to reconstruct a statute conferring narrowly substantive
and procedural rights and obligations on government employers and em-
ployees with respect to tenure and termination in terms of offer, acceptance,
or at least bargained-for terms, and consideration. Theories of contract law
18. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 71 (1985).
19. See Note, Intent. Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation
in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 894 & 894 n.23 (1982)(citing Supreme Court
recognition of an effectuated legislative compromise).
20. See the summary analysis in id. at 900.
21. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 29
(1985)(referring to the views of "competing elite" theorists).
22. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 320 (1986).
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that focus, respectively, on will, reliance, fairness, efficiency, bargain, or
consent2 can all directly contribute to our descriptive and normative under-
standing of the employment statutes in question.
The contractual approach avoids the crudeness of certain interest
group theories of legislation that view statutes "as commodities that are
purchased by particular interest groups or coalitions of interest groups that
outbid and outmaneuver competing interest groups." '24 In our central cases,
it is more fruitful, and more realistic, to view the statute not as a unitary
purchase or prize, but as an entity subject to "joint" or "minority" owner-
ship reflective of bargaining, compromise, or mutual accomodation of pref-
erences and priorities based partly on the relative willingness and ability of
each party to pay.
Just as our theory does not assume sole and exclusive ownership of the
relevant employment tenure and termination statues, so it does not assume
or rely upon any judicial ability to accurately reconstruct the precise "com-
plex array"28 of bargaining patterns and motivations that resulted in legis-
lative enactment of the statute in question. Judge Easterbrook has argued
that in at least certain cases, an analyst or judge might ask: "Who lobbied
for the legislation? What deals were struck in the cloakrooms? Who de-
manded what and who gave up what? 12 6 Our approach, in contrast, looks
only to whatever contractual elements may be fairly inferred from a gen-
eral, broadly applicable theory of interest group bargaining and the text of
the statute itself, and gives more developed scope to contract-based defenses
and excuses in judicially interpreting the contract, or contracts, that are
detected than does Judge Easterbrook's. 27
Our greater concern for contract-law defenses as cues or permissions
for judicial reinterpretation or non-enforcement of a statute in an appropri-
ate case does not mean, however, that our approach is generally more redis-
tributive than Judge Easterbrook's. Presumably, some interest group bar-
gains could not be struck at all, or would be differently struck, if the parties
anticipated the relatively searching inquiry into cloakroom machinations
23. This typology is drawn from id. generally and at 269 in particular.
24. See Macey, supra note 16, at 227.
25. See id. at 228.
26. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4,
17 (1984).
27. Cf Macey, supra note 16, at 236 ("Judge Easterbrook concludes that the quality of
a judge construing a statute is determined by his ability to seek out and enforce the nature of
the original agreement between the legislature and the special interest group"). On our ap-
proach, of course, the legislature itself is not regarded as a relevant contracting party, for
purposes of the due process analysis. While Judge Easterbrook is in fact willing to view the
contract as between the special interests, he does not pursue the possible applicability of tradi-
tional contract defenses to enforcement. See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 18.
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endorsed by Judge Easterbrook.28
From a different perspective, Professor Richard Stewart has skeptically
noted that "[a] statute is a curious form of 'contract.' How does one iden-
tify the parties to it?"' While this task, as formulated, appears daunting,
our approach does not require full identification and specification of the
complete roster of parties bound by one statutory provision or another. In
our typical government employment circumstance, it will be plain that the
rights and obligations of both the employer and the employees, collectively
and individually, are implicated by the statutory terms, and that both par-
ties to the due process of employment termination case were represented, if
perhaps by agents, in the relevant bargaining processes. Of course, any indi-
vidual employee will normally be held bound by any statutory terms incor-
porated, by reference or otherwise, into the individual employment agree-
ment or contract to which he expressly consented, as evidenced by his
signature, at the outset of his employment term.
Despite the loose usage in the interest group theory literature, there is,
further, no reason to assume that a single statute, as a whole, will constitute
the single relevant contract involved. Certainly, the relevant employer-em-
ployee contract regarding employment termination may be embodied by
only one or two sections of a broader statute.
Our theory, therefore, unlike Judge Easterbrook's, does not require
that the courts conduct any inquiry into what a rational, or a wealth-maxi-
mizing, legislature would want.30 Our focus is instead generally upon actual
written terms, with there generally being no need to supply or interpolate
rational or standard missing terms.
Similarly, our approach does not rely on Judge Easterbrook's view that
the legislature, having created the substantive job entitlement in the first
place, is, as opposed to the courts, the "logical judge" of how much process
or procedure is due upon employee termination.31 Whether the courts are
instead the logical judge of these sorts of due process matters is of course
largely the point at issue; the primary virtue of our approach is that it be-
comes possible to say to the disappointed party not merely that the right
institution decided the question, but that the disappointed party agreed, in
one form of contract or another, to the result, or to the process that led to
the result. Ultimately, consent or agreement, at least under appropriate cir-
28. See supra text accompanying note 26.
29. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92
YALE L.J. 1537, 1551 (1983).
30. Cf. Easterbrook, Due Process and Parole Decision Making, in PAROLE IN THE 1980s
77, 91 (B. Borsage ed. 1981).
31. See id. at 94. See also Laycock, Due Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort
to Make the Due Process Clauses Nonjusticiable, 60 TEx. L. REV. 875, 883-84 (1982).
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cumstances, is among the most powerful of moral justifications.3 2
That one of the parties to the contract, or one of the negotiators, is the
government or a government agency does not tend, ordinarily, to impair the
validity of our contractual analysis. While the notion of government may
suggest monopoly, and the possibility of monopoly bargaining power, in the
typical run of our due process of employment termination cases, the govern-
ment, through its actions or its very existence, will not tend to have nar-
rowed appreciably the employment options otherwise available for actual or
prospective government employees.33 A fortiori, the government will not
have driven out of existence otherwise available private sector jobs for
teachers, office clerical workers, etc., featuring a private sector analogue of
the sort of vigorous, painstaking due process of dismissal sought typically
by the employee plaintiffs in the government job termination cases.
Finally, our approach does not assume that the legislative process is
devoid of genuine public interest considerations.3 4 Even in those instances,
though, in which the government employer and employee negotiators are
driven by opposed senses of the public interest or of their own group inter-
est to the extent that no relevant contract, or semblance of a contract, can
be said to be embodied in the statute, it may nonetheless be reasonable to
conclude that their advocacy of public and private or group interest, as re-
flected in the statute, has served to "potentiate" any later employment con-
tracts entered into between the government and individual employees.
Thus our approach does not maintain that any statute is ever utterly
reducible to a publicly solemnized or publicly mediated agreement among
private parties.3 5 Our approach in fact insists, on the contrary, that the type
of government employment statute at issue in our cases should also be
viewed as an instrument that may affect the rights of third parties and as
an instance of authoritative "government speech,"3 6 implicating the general
citizenry's interest, or right, to perspicuousness in government speech.
IV. THE TERMS OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT BARGAIN
To reinforce, as well as to implement, the general contract approach to
due process, it must be shown that the sorts of admittedly sharply limited
procedures in event of employee dismissal specified by the relevant statutes,
32. See generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
33. See Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 3, 28 (1983).
34. Cf. Stewart, supra note 29, at 1550.
35. For a brief contrast between the "public interest" and "interest group" conceptions
of the legislative process, see R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 262-63 (1985).
36. Many aspects of the constitutional problems associated with "government speech"
are addressed in M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983).
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and not those statutory procedures as augmented by reviewing courts in the
name of due process, would be voluntarily chosen and agreed to, in ad-
vance, by the relevant, directly affected parties, including individuals in the
position of Roth3 7 and Kennedys8 and Loudermill.31 Any additional, unbar-
gained-for procedural rights conferred by the courts on employees should be
subject to justification via traditional contract law principles, lest the court
be guilty of simply rewriting a contract on the basis only of its own unsolic-
ited conception of fairness.4 0
In this regard, it is important to recognize that termination procedures
agreed to voluntarily by government employers and employees should not
simply be expected to maximize the achievement of any single aim or pur-
pose or goal, including the elaborateness or the extent of procedural safe-
guards afforded upon termination.4 1 There will, for each party, be tradeoffs
and competing goals.
Nor should we conclude that the limited, precisely specified procedural
rights accorded the employees in cases like Roth, Arnett, or Loudermill are
explainable as simply reflecting an absence of agreement between the par-
ties. If employers and employees are in unresolvable disagreement as to ap-
propriate procedural rights and obligations in the event of employee termi-
nation, the relatively unequivocal language of the statutes in the cases
immediately above is hardly the most obvious or satisfactory outcome. Ir-
reconcilable differences between employers and employees are more plausi-
bly reflected by much vaguer drafting techniques, such as vacuous phrases
- "to the extent feasible" - or "empty standards, lists of unranked deci-
sional goals, and contradictory standards" 42 regarding dismissal procedures.
As well, we should resist the temptation to simply assume4 3 that a gov-
ernment employee, or prospective employee, or his union, will tend to be
utterly without power to bargain over or exert upward pressure on the level
of procedural protection accorded on termination, if termination process
rights are genuinely valued.
37. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
38. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
39. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1987). For further dis-
cussion of Loudermill, see Flax, Liberty, Property and the Burger Court: The Entitlement
Doctrine in Transition, 60 TULANE L. REv. 889 (1986).
40. For a repudiation of this role in the context of private parties, see, e.g., Broad v.
Rockwell int. Corp., 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Yankee
Atomic Elec. Co. v. New Mexico and Arizona Land Co., 632 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1980);
Brokers Title Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174 (3d Cir. 1979).
41. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 208, 220 (1976).
42. See Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative
Law, 64 TEX. L. REv. 469, 478 (1985).
43. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in
the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445, 449 (1977).
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Any theory that minimizes the existence or value of employee or union
bargaining over termination procedures on grounds of alleged employee
powerlessness must first account for the overwhelmingly important fact of a
remarkably low employee dismissal rate in the federal civil service. Profes-
sor Frug reported a dismissal rate, for the years 1972 through 1974, of
0.02%, or one employee dismissal for every 5,000 employees." One crucial
implication of this rate is that whether or not one wishes to consider it too
low on efficiency grounds, it provides an obvious and powerful incentive for
relevantly placed government employees to limit the priority they accord to
their procedural rights upon the unlikely event of dismissal."6
Even if employee dismissal rates were much higher, we should not be
surprised by agreed-upon limited procedural rights upon termination be-
tween parties of equal bargaining strength.4" Contracts terminable utterly
at will, with essentially no procedural rights, are commonly observed be-
tween parties of roughly equal bargaining power.47 Professor Epstein's ar-
gument in this regard can be extended to suggest that an absence of em-
ployee bargaining power sufficient to call into question the validity of an
apparent agreement on the extent or degree of procedure appropriate in
termination cases should manifest itself, at least with some frequency, in an
employee being bound to the employer for a term, at the employer's option,
where the employer retains the right to dismiss the employee at will. 8
Granting that government employees are not utterly playthings of their
fate, it is still technically possible to argue that the level of termination
procedures specified by statute is only superficially a reflection of the intent
and agreement of the parties. Perhaps it was intended, and expected by the
parties, at the time of enactment, that the judiciary would intervene to add
to the employees' procedural rights, and add to employers' obligations, in
44. Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?,
124 U. PA. L. REV. 942, 945 n.13 (1976). This figure has been cited in Simon, Liberty and
Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 146, 165
n.57 (1983).
45. While it is possible to argue that low dismissal rates are due not to employee bar-
gaining strength, but largely to the threat of judicial expansion of the procedural rights of
otherwise powerless employees upon termination, this argument carries the burden of inherent
implausibility, as well as its difficulty in accounting for low termination rates prior to the era
of judicial expansion of statutory procedural rights on due process grounds.
46. The notion of equality or inequality of bargaining power is best explained by those
seeking to set aside a formally valid contract. If the notion of inequality of bargaining power is
essentially that a prospective employee has very little practical choice about accepting an of-
fered government job, or that government employee unions are essentially without influence
over procedural matters, then the arguments raised in this section must be rebutted.
47. See Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 947, 965-66
(1984).
48. See id. at 973.
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the name of due process. This possibility has been raised in other contexts.49
As it is always possible, however, to claim that any agreement was intended
to be judicially rewritten later to favor a particular party, it is incumbent
upon a critic of the contract approach to show, for example, that the gov-
ernment employer actually expected and agreed in advance to the litigated
outcome of what appear to be hard-fought employee termination cases re-
sulting in a judicial expansion of employee procedural rights.
A simpler contractual analysis, in contrast, carries more plausibility.
Risk-neutral or even risk-aversive employees may well prefer a package of
slightly higher benefits, with minimal or no enforceable procedures on ter-
mination, as long as they anticipate a continuing pattern of remarkably in-
frequent involuntary job terminations. After all, more procedure does not
guarantee redress or reversal of an unfavorable decision. Employees may
reason that in the unlikely event of dismissal, they may well learn the rea-
sons for employer dissatisfaction and have an opportunity to respond,
sheerly out of the employer's own self-interest, in the absence of any statu-
tory procedures at all.5 0
Even assuming that additional procedure on termination is utterly
without cost to the employee, in time, money, humiliation, or embarass-
ment, the employee may well be motivated to trade off procedural rights of
49. See, e.g., Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity
Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1553 (1983). Cf G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE
OF STATUTES 66 (1982)(statutorily fixed dollar amount as intended by parties to automatically
self-destruct, over time, due to inflation).
It might relatedly be argued that the parties may contract with a view to the common law
judicial tendency to critically scrutinize contract provisions relating to, or more particularly,
limiting the enforceable remedies a party may have upon the other party's breach or default.
See. e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.18, at 895 '(1982). See also Note, Fairness,
Flexibility, and the Waiver of Remedial Rights by Contract, 87 YALE L.J. 1057 (1978)
("functional equivalent" of an adequate hearing must be provided).
In our typical cases, of course, we are not concerned with adequacy of remedies post-
breach. The issue, typically, is instead whether the employer has breached, or dismissed the
employee on improper grounds, or upon less than the contractually specified procedures. An
employer who improperly dismisses an employee in these senses, or breached, is on our theory,
subject to the full panoply of remedies on behalf of the employee, contractual or judicial.
It may be that the contractualist analysis is not equally suitable in other contexts. See,
e.g., Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985). But while it may be sensible to deny, for example, that a stock
purchase constitutes an implicit consent to managerial self-dealing, our employment contexts
ordinarily involve employee unions, lobbyists, or other experienced, expert players acting with
presumably reasonable fidelity to the interests of the bulk of employees.
50. While the Kafkaesque predicament of an employee who is dismissed without any
explanation has been raised, see, e.g., Van Alstyne, Cracks in "'The New Property": Adjudica-
tive Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445, 448-49 (1977), it is,
as discussed further below, questionable how much a rational federal employee would pay, in
other benefits foregone, to obtain greater assurance of some explanation for an unlikely future
dismissal.
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dubious actual value for slightly more of other job benefits.51 The argument
below will suggest why in further detail. For the moment, we might simply
note the possible objection that quite often, employees will tend to irration-
ally discount the obviously small probability of an unexplainable involun-
tary job dismissal, in the same way, perhaps, that many of us irrationally
fail to wear seatbelts while driving. On this objection, a judicial rewriting of
voluntarily agreed-to procedures simply supplies rationality.
Certainly, it is possible that a requirement of a detailed prior written
statement of reasons for termination may discourage unjust, trumped up, or
simply casually erroneous dismissals. 52 This should be apparent to ordina-
rily perceptive individuals. But even if such persons tend to irrationally dis-
count the value of such procedures, because they are valuable only on rare
occasions, unions, or bargaining agents, are formed and paid partly to de-
velop the insights that avoid such irrational results. If, as is assumed by
hypothesis, the detailed prior written statement requirement is of value only
rarely, this reflects in part the rarity of involuntary termination. If such a
statement is rarely prepared, the cost of doing so will, as a percentage of
the employer's budget, be low. If the cost to the employer of moving to a
detailed prior written statement rule is relatively low, the issue would seem
readily bargainable from the employer's standpoint.
To the extent that such a requirement would impose any costs on the
employer, the employer's reluctance to agree to it is justifiable on progres-
sive grounds. Every small reduction in the cost to the employer of dismissal
allows, to that extent, the employer to take a chance on hiring disadvan-
taged, disfavored, or marginal potential employees, beyond what would be
legally compelled, on the basis of reduced initial screening and filtering
CoStS. 53
Finally, from the employees' standpoint, at least some minimal weight
may be attached to the ease or difficulty of "explaining away" an involun-
tary termination, to oneself, or to prospective future employees. The greater
the available process, the greater the difficulty in credibly claiming that the
dismissal is anything other than an accurate reflection on one's competence.
Minimal termination procedures may ease the transition into post-termina-
tion employment."
51. See Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 85, 117-18 (P.
Kurland, G. Casper & D. Hutchinson eds. 1983).
52. See Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion
Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 60, 86 (1976).
53. Cf. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 972
(1984)(making an analogous argument in the context of at will dismissal contracts).
54. A similar point is made in id. at 970, again in the context of at-will employment
contracts. The psychological costs of increasingly unassailable accuracy in unfavorable per-
sonal evaluations is a major theme of the celebrated fantasy, M. YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE
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While it has, then, proven irresistibly tempting to courts to "be-
nignly"55 reinterpret statutes to provide termination procedures greater
than those bargained for, we should not be surprised if the result of benign
judicial intentions is less of what employees happen to actually value more,
any more than if, in a spirit of similar benevolence, the courts mandated,
say, compulsory unpaid afternoon work breaks.
Of course, the benefits accruing to the employer, at least in the first
instance, from modest, voluntarily arrived at procedural minima are clear,
and the costs to the employer of truly arbitrary or unfair dismissals are
similarly clear. Even if there is only a minimum level of contractually-de-
rived procedure required in the event of a termination, there are obvious
practical disincentives to arbitrary dismissals. Any termination perceived to
be arbitrary may, for example, lead the most competent employees to reas-
sess the security of their own position, and to seek to transfer from the
organization."
Relatedly, any arbitrary dismissal imposes organizational costs that
often are borne by the arbitrary decision maker himself. Most obvious is the
cost of locating, selecting, and training a replacement for the dismissed em-
ployee who may well work out less well than the terminated employee, who,
by hypothesis, was perfectly competent.57 If it is argued that employees
may tend to be largely fungible, at least in the long run, with replacement
workers likely to be no worse than one arbitrarily dismissed, this in itself
suggests why government employers may be willing to acquiesce in very low
actual involuntary dismissal rates, as long as the procedural cost of the rare
dismissal is kept relatively low.
Of course, in cases of a genuinely erroneous or ill-founded termination,
it will be in the direct and substantial "investment" interest of both the
employer and the employee to allow any reasonable opportunity for infor-
mally disabusing the decisionmaker of her error. Beyond cases of genuine
employer error, however, the employers may well wish to pay some price to
avoid costly "curtailment of administrative discretion and . . . freedom to
rely upon their intuition, their impressions, and their underlying goals,
aims, and values when making discretionary decisions.""
While the employers, or the organization in some official sense, bears
MERITOCRACY (1959).
55. The phrase is drawn from Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudica-
tive Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 471 (1977).
56. Cf Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 968
(1984)(at will employment context).
57. Id. at 974 (at will employment context). See also Simon, Liberty and Property in
the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 146, 170 (1983)(organi-
zational incentives to minimize arbitrariness).
58. Simon, supra note 57, at 157.
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much of the cost imposed by any employees retained only because a great
deal in the way of procedures is required for termination," it must be
remembered that the ordinary, competent employees pay a portion of the
price of co-workers that create unnecessary work, require extraordinary su-
pervision, or undermine moral. This point will be obvious to no one as much
as to the employees, or their bargaining agents, and their negotiating incen-
tives and priorities should be appropriately affected. Employees may rea-
sonably feel that their less competent colleagues are already sufficiently un-
dislodgeable, for reasons unrelated to the judicial enhancement of due
process sought by the claimant in cases like Roth or Arnett.
Precisely because the government agency need not turn a profit or face
unequivocally the discipline of the market, there are unusually large oppor-
tunities for a government agency to accomodate, and accomodate itself to,
the less competent employee, short of termination. Once procedure in excess
of that contractually acceptable to the parties is imposed, though, the pro-
cess is difficult to stop. As has been pointed out, the task of preparing a
detailed written statement of reasons for dismissal before termination may
well not be onerous in a given case, but the spectre of a hollow, formalistic,
largely boilerplate statement of reasons by the employer virtually demands
inquisitive judicial review of the substantive adequacy of the statement of
reasons, at greater cost.60
There is thus every reason to suppose that the interests of uncoerced,
rational government employers and employees would converge, at least as a
first approximation, on the sort of contractually-based, express, statutorily-
embodied procedures relied upon by the employer in cases such as Roth
and Arnett. This is of course not to suggest in the slightest that contractual-
ism between or among interest groups provides a descriptively or norma-
tively fully satisfactory account of the development of constitutionally ade-
quate statutes. 61 There is no reason, at least to this point, to assume that
the factors left out of account on a contractual theory should systematically
undermine the bargains struck, in such a way as to require additional, judi-
cially imposed procedures.
It should also be remembered that a contractual analysis in this con-
text draws not only upon any contractual understandings reached and em-
bodied at the statutory level, when the legislation or regulations are drafted,
but the contractual process inherent in the decision by every individual pro-
spective government employee to accept or reject an offer of government
59. See Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 3, 29 (1983).
60. See Simon, supra note 57, at 158-59.
61. See Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values,
92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1549 (1983)("a gross oversimplification to regard most statutes as the
product of a bargain among . . . organized interests").
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employment on the terms, including procedural rights on termination, speci-
fied in the government's offer." Contractualism thus operates at two levels.
At both, as a rule, a contractual analysis, by virtue of its normative
strength, argues generally in favor of an expanded Rehnquist-like approach,
and against the view currently held by a majority of the Supreme Court.
This is chiefly because unconstrained government employers and employees
would tend to agree, for the reasons referred to above, on the extent of
procedural protection acceptable to Justice Rehnquist, but not to the major-
ity of his colleagues.
V. CRITICISMS OF THE REHNQUIST APPROACH AND A CONTRACTUALIST
RESPONSE
A. The Role of Due Process Values
The response to Justice Rehnquist's approach to these issues has been
generally frosty. One commentator has characterized the academic response
as one of "repulsion." 63 None of the standard criticisms is cogent, however,
as against a Rehnquist-like analysis, as elaborated in the above contractual
terms.
The academic critique of the Rehnquist view overlaps only to a limited
degree with the judicial critique, or the current majority view. The judicial
critique was recently summarized in Loudermill:
the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights
- life, liberty, and property - cannot be deprived [sic] except
pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories
of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule other-
wise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. "Prop-
erty" cannot be defined by the procedures for its deprivation any
more than can life or liberty. . . . "While the legislature may
elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it
may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an in-
62. Cf. Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 1986), in which Judge Easter-
brook, in a somewhat different context, observes that "[t]he state may not dragoon people to
be [prison] guards. Would-be guards, represented by their labor unions, may decide to accept
a little less safety in exchange for a little higher pay." Judge Easterbook concludes that the
employees cannot then "turn around and say that the constitution required that safety be a
larger component of the total package." Id.
Even assuming a purely contractual analysis, though, Easterbrook's conclusion may be
hasty. A contract defense such as substantive unconscionability may apply in the context of
life-or-death safety conditions not specified in an employment contract, if such a defense ap-
plies anywhere. An issue of degree of procedural detail upon termination, where those proce-
dures are plainly spelled out in advance, less obviously raises unconscionability issues.
63. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 3, 29 (1983).
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terest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural
safeguards."'64
The academic critique draws upon and inspires the judicial critique, but is
broader and is more leisurely, extensively argued.
Perhaps preeminent among the variety of themes developed as a cri-
tique of the Rehnquist approach is that of the value of intrinsic human
dignity as mandating the availability of some minimum level of dismissal
procedures, presumably in excess of those prescribed by statute. The theory
is that the additional procedures "indicate respect for human beings, and a
commitment to treat people as ends rather than means.""
As an abstract matter, of course, it indeed seems violative of an em-
ployee's dignity to arbitrarily dismiss her without some minimal procedural
safeguards. Respect for individual autonomy also suggests, for example,
that if a terminated employee knowingly chooses to run the risk of addi-
tional embarrassment and humiliation that may result from a costly process
of discovery and cross-examination, the law should not paternalistically
shield the employee from that choice. 66
To the extent that a Rehnquist-based approach simply points to a stat-
ute conferring a specified level of procedures and asserts the authoritative-
ness of the statute, even in a constitutional context, it may be vulnerable to
such dignitary-based criticisms. Not all validly enacted statutes comport
with the dignitary claims of all persons they affect.
But to the extent that a Rehnquist-based approach is developed along
the contractual lines suggested above, the dignitary critique seems mis-
placed. The crucial error of the dignitary critique becomes its failure to
recognize that there is obviously dignitary value in courts' reasonably treat-
ing government employees as autonomous, competent, rational actors capa-
ble of appropriately entering into and being bound by their own decisions,
or their own contracts, or those of their agents.
When the procedural rights and obligations of the parties were being
64. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985)(quoting Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in
part))(brackets in Loudermill). This decisive rejection of the Rehnquist analysis in Arnett has
been remarked upon in such cases as Bailey v. Kirk, 777 F.2d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1985) and
Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 836 n.7 (Ist Cir. 1985).
65. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1110
(1984). See also Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in
XVIII NoMOs: DUE PROCESS 126, 131 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Mashaw,
Administrative Due Process: The Quest For a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REV. 885, 914
(1981).
66. See Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity, and a Kantian Injunction, in XVIII NoMos:
DUE PROCESS 172, 174-75 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
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initially hammered out, or when the individual employee entered into her
own employment agreement, involuntary termination of employment was
merely a risk, presumably a low risk. Once the risk materializes, and be-
comes a reality, the employee's incentives, costs, priorities, and preferences
are of course hugely different. The employee may even choose to impose
costs on the employer, for reasons of frustration or revenge, extending be-
yond self interest.
The employee has, on our theory, already answered the question of
minimum procedures consistent with individual dignity. To focus on digni-
tary matters beginning only with the notice of termination is wrongly
atemporal. Dignity and autonomy require at least some explanation for
treating the employee as not competent to enter into antecedently quite rea-
sonable and fair contracts as to employment terms, and procedures in the
event of termination.67 Under the guise of a concern for dignity and auton-
omy, the critiques of our elaborated Rehnquist model evidence their own
basic paternalism.
Our discussion in the preceding section indicates the rationality of an
employee's failure to insist at the time of contracting on the sorts of proce-
dures now mandated by the Supreme Court majority. In general, the more
elaborate and costly68 the procedures, including such aspects as adversary
discovery at the extreme, are to both parties, the greater the logic of em-
ployers' offering and employees' accepting some less elaborate set of proce-
dures, in exchange for some greater amount of other benefits, perhaps in-
cluding practical job security. Dignity, post-termination, cannot reasonably
be simply invoked as a constitutional trump card.6'
It thus misses the point to assert that the dignity of the employee can-
not be made dependent upon potentially defective majoritarian political
processes, or mere legislative fiat. While further response to this approach
will be made below, the basic point, discrimination problems aside, must be
that contractualism adds an element of bindingness, apart from contract
defenses, absent from a merely externally imposed legislative standard.70
67. Richard Epstein has written, in a somewhat different context, that "[wlith employ-
ment contracts . . . we are dealing with the routine stuff of ordinary life; people who are
competent enough to marry, vote, and pray are not unable to protect themselves in their day-
to-day business transactions." Epstein, In Defense of Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
947, 954 (1984).
68. As Professor Epstein notes, process costs will tend to be high, at the judicial stage,
as summary judgment will rarely be appropriate, given that employer motive, for example, will
often be at issue. See id. at 970.
69. Cf. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach
to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. III, 151 (1978).
70. Cf. id. at 150. See also Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestions For the Revival
of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 261, 284 (P. Kurland, G. Casper, & D.
Hutchinson eds. 1976). Professor Tushnet points to the problem of politicized control over
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A pattern is established by the analysis of the dignitary value critique.
Any number of academic critiques of the unelaborated Rehnquist model,
alleging insufficient attention to any number of "due process values," will
be undercut by a contractual elaboration of the Rehnquist approach.
Professor Redish, for example, has sought to establish the participation
of an independent adjudicator as a necessary condition for procedural due
process.' Ordinarily, of course, this requirement will not help distinguish
the Rehnquist or the contractual approach from the current majority ap-
proach, as an independent adjudicator is normally provided under either
approach. Even if no independent adjudicator is available, as seems true, at
least at an initial stage, in Arnett v. Kennedy,7 2 it is far from clear why
even this basic element is utterly unbargainable.
Even assuming some risk aversion on the part of an employee, it is
perfectly reasonable for the employee to consider the low probability of an
involuntary discharge, or the arguably low probability of the reversal of an
involuntary discharge due precisely to the independence of the adjudicator.
Especially if there is not full and complete adversariness between govern-
ment employer and employee, there may even be something of a tradeoff of
independence of the adjudicator for the intimate familiarity with the office
and the employee that a less independent, formally neutral adjudicator may
provide.
A similar response can be made to the suggestion of Professor Mashaw
that the value of rationality itself requires that in the context of involuntary
dismissal of government employees, "a reason must be provided at a consti-
tutional minimum. '7 The amount that reasonable employees would be will-
ing to pay, in effect, for a contractual guarantee of this right would be
minimal. Waiving, or bargaining away, this right is perfectly sensible from
the standpoint of employee self-interest or utility.
One obvious consideration for the employee at the time of contracting,
apart from the minimal likelihood of involuntary dismissal, is that "[bly the
lower level bureaucrats, and their vulnerability to termination in that regard. This problem
was of course partially ameliorated by the Court's decisions in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347
(1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
71. Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 457 (1986).
72. See 416 U.S. at 197 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest For a Dignitary Theory, 61
B.U.L. REV. 885, 928 (1981). See also Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Proce-
dural Due Process, in XVII NoMos: DUE PROCESS 126, 127 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1977)(values of revelation or explanation and participation in the termination decision). But
see Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a
Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 60, 79 n.69 (1976)("participational aims are of
marginal importance to government job security").
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time the matter has degenerated to the point where outright dismissal or
nonrenewal is likely, there has usually been substantial discussion and disa-
greement, and both sides have developed a fairly good idea of the other's
views.""
Some form of statements of reason, explanation, participation, oppor-
tunity to respond, and to amend one's behavior are virtually woven into the
normal operation of the government office, at least at an informal level. To
the extent that a statement of reasons requirement is constitutionalized be-
yond this level, it is not of significant value to the employee, especially at
the time of contracting, and may be perceived as costly by the employer, in
that at some point, the formal judicialization of a statement of reasons re-
quirement impairs the government's ability to act on the basis of what it
intuitively, subjectively knows, but has difficulty in unassailably
articulating.
It is also important to recognize in this context that contracts between
employers and employees may be limited in their scope and contemplation.
Just as employees do not normally intend to agree to subject themselves to
the statutorily unsanctioned prospect of being dismissed simply on the
grounds of race or sex, so there will ordinarily be no evidence that an em-
ployee has consented to be given less in the way of notice and explanation
for termination than employees of a different race or sex.
Even if we assume indifference on the part of the employer to the dig-
nitary concerns of the employee, it is worth bearing in mind that the em-
ployer's undeniable interest in reasonably accurate decision-making proce-
dures regarding employee termination already largely accomodates and
overlaps with employee dignitary interests. Termination decisions made
hastily, arbitrarily, in secret, without consultation, may not only not con-
duce to the employee's dignity in that respect, but they will also tend to be
less accurate or sound, contrary to the obvious interests of both parties.
The courts ought not, however, exalt even an uncontroversial value
such as accuracy into an end in itself, or a value beyond that fairly agreed
to by the relevant parties. While we want to "ensure" accuracy in govern-
ment employment decisionmaking,7 5 it is far from clear that we want to
second guess, or violate the expressed preferences of, the directly affected
parties as to the price of an additional increment in accuracy. Beyond a
certain contractually recognized point, additional accuracy is simply not
cost-effective.
74. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 146, 188 (1983).
75. See Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044,
1102 (1984).
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What has been said of the due process values discussed particularly
above may be said of due process values in general. In certain respects, it
may not be harmful to think of the requirement of due process as protecting
the values specified above, as well as others.7 ' The harm lies in supposing,
unreasonably, that freely negotiating parties would agree to maximize some
particular value, or the sum of a set of due process values, whether the
interests of the parties conflict or not.
B. Due Process and Protection of the Powerless
The literature critical of the Rehnquist approach also concerns itself
more broadly with the importance of protection of "the politically weak and
powerless""7 from "oppression"7 8 of individual employees or from proce-
dures otherwise "intolerable in a humane society. ' 79 The crucial assumption
of such a critique, of course, is the status of the employee, or the govern-
ment employee union, as a passive, helpless, powerless victim, rather than a
minimally competent, autonomous, ordinarily rational actor.
This unargued for assumption is easily falsified. The most obvious line
is to note the incompatibility of employee powerlessness with historically
remarkably low involuntary dismissal rates for federal civil service employ-
ees.80 It is simply implausible to characterize government employees, or
their unions, as insufficiently powerful, politically or otherwise, to insist on
higher standards of procedure upon dismissal, where they have been able to
extract, de facto or de jure, such profound concessions elsewhere. 81
There are, of course, contexts in which a claim of majoritarian tyr-
76. See Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural
Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 469 (1986).
77. Comment, Fear of Firing: Arnett v. Kennedy and the Protection of Federal Career
Employees, 10 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 472, 483-84 (1975).
78. Rubin, supra note 75, at 1119.
79. Van Alstyne, Cracks In "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process In the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 451 (1977). See also Saphire, Specifying
Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. I1I, 159 n.214 (1978)(noting the absence of the use of the term "compassion"
from the Court's language).
80. See supra text accompanying note 44.
81. Even writers with sensitivity to some of the more doubtful assumptions of many of
the Rehnquist critics are subject to occasional lapse. Professor Williams writes that "[s]o long
as the government keeps a 'beneficiary' on tenterhooks by making receipt or loss of a benefit
discretionary, it can keep free of the trammels of due process." Williams, Liberty and Prop-
erty: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUDIES 3, 13 (1983). One is not
"kept" anywhere, in the relevant sense, if one has elected that position among reasonably
valuable alternative positions. The state of affairs referred to by Williams is, on our approach,
bargained for, consented to, and avoidable if the employees are inclined to make presumably
modest concessions in other areas.
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anny82 or oppression takes on plausibility.8" It is far from obvious, though,
why a union or other bargaining agent would choose to simply abandon or
waive the procedural rights upon termination of persons in the position of
Roth or Kennedy, down to a trivial level, for no recompense or return. The
ordinary legislative or contractual termination procedures would seem, at
least facially, to cut as close to home for more established or dominant-
group white male employees as for anyone else.84
It is conceivable that in some contexts, low or non-existent termination
procedures may pose equal protection problems.88 In our case, however, it is
perfectly reasonable for minority group members, even if they feel under-
represented by the union, to opt for modest levels of procedural protection,
in light of a range of considerations, including low risk of termination in the
first place, the availability of civil rights actions for discrimination not con-
templated by their contract, or the importance of other costly goals, includ-
ing hiring goals, layoff provisions, as in Wygant," or even such matters as
better severance benefits, should termination actually occur.87
These sorts of responses to critics of the Rehnquist approach do not in
the slightest depend upon some unduly narrow conception of what consti-
tutes a property or liberty interest for due process purposes, or upon the
illusion that injuries to liberty or property are, in this context, the only sort
of practically significant injury that the government as employer can in-
flict.88 On our theory, the employer and employees may bargain over and
negotiate an agreement as to any practically significant aspect of the job or
its termination, substantive or procedural. No significant point is unbar-
gainable, a priori, because it does not fall within some conception of what
constitutes a protectable property or liberty interest.
What our approach generally rules out, for example, is not a consider-
ation of the importance to the employee of having a job, but a judicial
reweighing or rewriting of a contract, after the contingency of involuntary
82. See Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest For a Dignitary Theory, 61
B.U.L. REV. 885, 900 (1981).
83. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1850 n.8 (1986)(burden
of layoffs placed entirely on the most junior union members).
84. In this respect, our typical case should be distinguished from cases such as United
States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980), where there were arguably only
minimal incentives for the union to bargain effectively on behalf of the eventual plaintiffs.
85. See Laycock, Due Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort to Make the Due
Process Clauses Nonjusticiable, 60 TEx. L. REV. 875, 888 (1982).
86. See supra note 83.
87. See Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947, 967
(1984).
88. Cf. Monaghan, Of "'Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 408-09
(1977); Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1095
(1984).
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termination has occurred. s9 As a first approximation, this would be no more
legitimate in our context than it would be for a court to weigh and balance
an insured's interest in having coverage broad enough to encompass a re-
cent serious accident against an insurer's unexpected obligation to pay out
on the apparently uncovered accident.
VI. THE SCOPE OF THE BARGAIN, LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION, AND
JUDICIAL REWRITING
A contractual theory of due process cannot, of course, guarantee that
all such putative contracts will be unambiguous 0 and well-understood in
fact9I by the parties. Nevertheless, the courts should not simply accept
without persuasive explanation that a given, or typical, employee's expecta-
tions or comprehension is selectively and conveniently confined only to the
beneficial terms of the agreement.92
It is possible to argue that an exploitive, manipulative employer might
seek to propagandize its employees into overlooking the limitations on em-
ployee procedural rights, in some fashion sufficient to prevent a contractual
agreement on those limitations from ever arising.93 It is certainly more
likely, however, that if the government as employer wishes to exploit and
manipulate its employees, it would in some fashion highlight and emphasize
its dismissal option, and emphasize that such procedural mechanisms as a
prior written statement of reasons requirement may well be of no value to
the employee, if the employer is determined to generate a judicially accept-
able reason.
89. Cf. Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445, 457-58 (1977).
90. See id. at 465.
91. See Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and
Perry, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 146, 177-78 (1983).
92. See id.
93. The literature is equivocal on how reasonable it is to attribute knowledge of "benefi-
cial" substantive statutory terms to the general public at large, while assuming ignorance of"restrictive" procedural terms on the part of the same public. Compare Grey, Procedural
Fairness and Substantive Rights, in XV III NoMos: DUE PROCESS 182, 195 (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman eds. 1977)("basic" substantive terms versus "highly technical" procedural terms)
with Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1195, 1259
(1982)(implausibility of assuming general citizen knowledge of statute's substantive benefits,
but ignorance of restrictive procedures) and Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982
SuP. CT. REV. 85, 11I (P. Kurland, G. Casper & D. Hutchinson eds. 1983)("there are lots of
poorly perceived substantive rules").
We explore in greater detail below the plausibility of skewed general public awareness,
due to propagandizing by either or both parties to the government employment contract. For
now, the point is that by consensus, we do not assume ignorance of procedural restrictions
embodied clearly and unambiguously, in statute and contract, on the part of either party,
employer or employee, actively and directly involved in the contract.
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If it is therefore not justifiable, all else equal, to assume that employees
should know, and are tied to, substantive aspects of their employment, but
are understandably remote from and faultlessly ignorant of the less attrac-
tive procedural limitations on those rights, the substance-procedure distinc-
tion will not bear the weight placed on it in this context by critics of the
Rehnquist approach. 94 It is unreasonable to, without further justification,
bear down harder judicially on procedural adequacy than on the scope of
more narrowly substantive rights between two parties, if the contract be-
tween the parties is as much reflective of bargaining over procedure as over
substance. In our typical cases, employees or their agents could and did
negotiate over procedural rights and responsibilities regarding dismissal as
over more obviously substantive matters. Courts should not rewrite proce-
dural terms of contracts where they would not rewrite substantive terms,
assuming the two can be coherently distinguished. In a phrase, even if sub-
stance is for legislatures, and procedures for courts, substance and proce-
dure equally should be left to contracting parties.
The view, then, that the Rehnquist approach concedes "unbridled dis-
cretion" to the legislature, then, misses the mark.95 At least on our interpre-
tation, the courts are understandably to concede discretion to contracting
parties as to the terms, substantive or procedural, of their own agreement.
No person or party is assumed to create a substantive right, and then claim,
on that basis, to establish unilaterally the limits, unduly narrow or other-
wise, for the exercise of that right.
It must be admitted, or asserted, that on our theory, constitutional law
does not typically add much to the already established contractual rights of
the parties, at least in the central cases.9" This is in part, however, because
contract-law defenses are not without point, and because contractual obli-
gations normally bind only contractants, and then only within the defined
94. See, e.g., Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property" 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 438
(1977); Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 146, 177 (1983).
95. See The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41,.90 (1974); Comment,
Fear of Firing: Arnett v. Kennedy and the Protection of Federal Career Employees, 10
HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 472, 482 (1975)(legislature vested with unlimited discretion re
procedural rights where it created statutorily the substantive rights). See also Rubin, Due
Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1070 (1984); Tushnet, The
Newer Property: Suggestions For the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT.
REV. 261, 271 (1976)(inevitable constitutional adequacy of the procedure afforded by statute
on Rehnquist theory). Laycock, Due Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort to Make
the Due Process Clauses Nonjusticiable, 60 TEx. L. REv. 875, 876 (1982).
96. See Tushnet, supra note 95, at id. See also Mashaw, Administrative Due Process:
The Quest For a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REV. 885, 891 (1981); Redish & Marshall,
Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455,
467 (1986).
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scope of their actual agreement.97
There is no reason to assume generally that the Rehnquist approach
makes "the applicability of due process safeguards depend upon the legisla-
ture's willingness to write protective procedures into the statute."98 Justice
Rehnquist, or an exponent of his general approach, could easily view an
absence of explicitly specified procedural provisions as a legislative invita-
tion to the courts to review the reasonableness of any procedures upon dis-
missal followed by administrative regulation, or custom, or practice. On our
analysis, a missing procedural term may, if there is nonetheless a contract
between employer and employee, amount to an invitation to supply a rea-
sonable procedural term. If "[p]rocedural rules usually are just a measure
of how much the substantive entitlements are worth,"99 or the "price" of
the substantive term, our theory would at this point merely hold open the
possibility of the court's supplying a reasonable price, or procedure, term. 00
There remains some point, on our theory, to classifying a wrongful gov-
ernment termination as a due process right violation, in addition to amount-
ing merely to a breach. That a government breach is also a violation of
constitutional right adds to its gravity to the general public, and therefore
to the costs to the government of engaging in the prohibited behavior. This
is apart from any procedural or jurisdictional advantage that may accrue to
a plaintiff who is able to allege a constitutional, as opposed to purely con-
tractual, wrong.
From the perspective developed to this point, it becomes clear why
there is no general need for even a moderate, restrained version of substan-
tive due process as a response to the Rehnquist theory. To the degree that
the parties have entered into a valid, legitimate contract governing the sub-
stance and procedure of dismissal rights, there will tend to be no supporting
social consensus on the importance or propriety of simply tipping the scales
in favor of one of the parties, in such a way as to activate Professor
Tushnet's substantive due process approach.10'
97. See Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. at 1502 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(quoting Arnett, 416
U.S. at 152 (plurality opinion)) (applying the Rehnquist approach only where the legislature
has clearly annexed a specific set of procedures-our approach would examine first the scope
and limits of the contract regarding procedures).
98. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to
Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. II I, 131 (1978).
99. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85, 113 (P. Kur-
land, G. Casper & D. Hutchinson eds. 1983).
100. For the permissibility of judicially supplying reasonable price terms, where there is
a valid but incomplete contract, see. e.g., S.F. Bouser v. F.K. Marks & Co., 96 Ark. 113, 131
S.W. 334 (1910); Sitzler v. Peck, 162 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1968); Konitsky v. Meyer, 49 N.Y.
571 (1872).
101. See Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestions For the Revival of Substantive
Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 261, 279-80 (P. Kurland, G. Casper & D. Hutchinson eds.
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Professor Van Alstyne, who has criticized the substantive due process
approach, 102 himself goes on attempt to build a reasonably potent concep-
tion of due process, in the form of "freedom from arbitrary adjudicative
procedures, '" 1 into the constitutional concept of "liberty" itself.' 4 The
most important response is to simply note that it is in fact judicially arbi-
trary to override the expressed wishes of the parties to a contract, assuming
only the rights and interests of only the parties are concerned, where there
is no showing of some sort of familiar contract-law defense or excuse. "Ar-
bitrariness" that is fairly bargained for is not arbitrary in a judicially corri-
gible sense.
It has been argued, finally, that the Rehnquist approach rests on a
"dubious" expressio unius assumption that where the legislature specified a
particular set of procedures upon job dismissal, it did not intend to allow
judicial imposition of more elaborate procedures not followed by the gov-
ernment employer. 05 Whatever the plausibility of suggesting that this as-
sumption overreads legislative intent in providing for particular procedures
upon dismissal, this criticism is obviously less persuasive in a contractual
context. Parties to a contract do not ordinarily, in the absence of demon-
strable mutual mistake, agree upon one set of procedures, merely to estab-
lish a "floor" or minimum that can be raised and made more elaborate
upon the argument of one, but not the other, party. To agree to procedural
rights of a certain value is not to agree to perhaps be subject to procedural
rights of a different value. 06
VII. CONTRACT LAW DEFENSES TO CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
Even on a contractual theory of due process, of course, not all con-
tracts should be enforced as written. Sometimes, as we shall see below, the
interests of non-contracting third parties may dictate or legitimize a judicial
re-writing of one or more terms of that contract. More narrowly, there must
be some role for at least some of the variety of historically recognized con-
tract defenses.
A contractual theory therefore cannot invariably adopt the view of
1976). See also Saphire, supra note 98, at 148-49. But see Van Alstyne, Cracks In "The New
Property": Adjudicative Due Process In the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445,
481-83 (1977).
102. See Van Alstyne, supra note 101, at id.
103. Id. at 487.
104. Id. See also Saphire, supra note 98, at 144.
105. See Comment, Fear of Firing- Arnett v. Kennedy and the Protection of Federal
Career Employees, 10 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 472, 486 (1975).
106. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURT'S 271 (1985)("if the statute is just the result
of a clash of interest groups, adding remedies to those expressly provided in the statute may
upset the compromises").
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Judge Posner that "where the lines of [legislative] compromise are discern-
ible, the judge's duty is to follow them, to implement not the purposes of
one group of legislators but the compromise itself." '07 Some traditional
sorts of contract defenses, such as incapacity, infancy, or intoxication, 08
will be plainly inapplicable. Other contract defenses, including mistake, im-
practicability, frustration of purpose, and even duress, misrepresentation,
and unconscionability, may be less obviously inapplicable,"°9 if perhaps only
in rare circumstances.
The due process cases have not explicitly raised or relied upon any
notion of contracts of adhesion or unconscionability," ° for example. Even if
the cases were judicially analyzed in contract terms, this would largely be
explainable on the grounds that government employees "are not infants,
impressionable heirs, or . . . prisoners of war."" '1
It may be unduly hasty, though, to simply conclude that fairness per-
mits dispensing at the outset with any defense of unconscionability raised
by a dismissed employee who seeks more elaborate termination procedures
than those actually followed. At least at the broad legislative stage, there
may be evidences of "corruption-concentrations of power, information
gaps, and so on."" ' 2
However reluctant we may be to entertain the notion that, for exam-
ple, at the legislative negotiating stage, a government union may be power-
less or manipulated into ignorance of significant facts, the possibility of un-
conscionability in application under particular constellations of fact is less
easily dismissed. The argument could be made, certainly, that under the
actual facts of Arnett v. Kennedy,"' or a variant of those facts, a defense of
unconscionability, or that the contract had failed or been frustrated of its
essential purpose, should be entertained. After all, in Arnett, "[tihe pro-
107. Id. at 289. Judge Easterbrook argues that "if statutes are bargains among special
interests, they should be enforced like contracts." Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (1984). Judge Easterbrook does not, for his pur-
poses, raise the question of the possible role of defenses to formally valid contracts, or of the
impingement of the contract on the rights or legitimate interests of third parties, or the appli-
cation of this principle generally in due process contexts.
108. See, e.g., Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 318
(1986).
109. See id.
110. See Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 3, 7 n.17 (1983)(referring to notion of contract not between parties but be-
tween state and its citizens).
I ll. Epstein, Unconsionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & ECON. 293, 304-05
(1975).
112. See Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest For a Dignitary Theory, 61
B.U.L. REV. 885, 922 (198 1)(referring to corruption of the "legislative process" itself).
113. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
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ceeding was to be conducted and decided by the very person whom [Ken-
nedy] had allegedly slandered, who had brought the complaint against him,
and who would then decide whether the complaint was correct." '" 14
VIII. THE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC AS A NON-PARTY TO THE
CONTRACT
A. Introduction
It is uncontroversial that the rights and interests of third parties, in-
cluding those of society at large, may limit the enforceability of agreements
freely entered into by the contractants." 5 This may impose limitations on
our otherwise sound inclination to routinely and mechanically enforce the
sorts of employment agreements we have referred to."'
Of course, the contracts we have been concerned with are normally at
least partially embodied in a legislative statute. A statute is at least nomi-
nally the act of agents of the public. Is there a sense in which it is reasona-
ble to view the society, or large segments of it, as not a party to the con-
tract, in the form of whatever the legislature has done? Further, even if the
public is permitted third party status with regard to the employment con-
tract, are there any cognizable public rights or interests which could be said
to be interferred with or abused in a typical employment termination case?
Our argument will be, issues of standing and justiciability aside, that
the general public, in a very practical sense of the body of ordinary private
citizens, authorizes the acts of its legislative agents, but is plainly not as
substantially and directly involved or concerned in the drafting or produc-
tion of the legislative contract as the recognized negotiating parties. The
public may be bound by legislative acts, and government employees may be
bound by the authorized acts of their legislative bargaining agent, but the
degree of intimacy, focus, and attention devoted is qualitatively different.
There is clearly a sense in which government employers and employees,
through their lobbyists or agents, may hammer out a contractual compro-
mise in the legislative forum without the mass of ordinary citizens taking,
directly or through their agents, the role of independent, active negotiators,
promoting their interests in a knowledgable way, so as to distinctively shape
the result.
114. Van Alstyne, Cracks In "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process In the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 461 (1977).
115. See, e.g., Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 763
(1983). See also Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 476
(1980).
116. Cf. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 18 (1984)("the appropriate plaintiffs will be those who claim 'breach,' not the larger
class of persons affected by a bargain to which they are not 'parties' ").
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The employment contract, even as legislatively embodied, then, may
be, and has been above, fully explainable on the basis of considering the
interests of only government employers and employees. No term of the con-
tract reflects a public interest distinct from the interest of one of the two
actual bargaining parties.
To further suggest why this might be so, as well as to suggest the sort
of public interest that might be neglected by this process, is the major task
confronting us below. We may begin by proposing that the form, or struc-
ture, of a legislatively embodied contract, or any statute, as opposed to the
content of the statute in a narrow sense, may adversely affect the public
interest. A statute may, more particularly, lend itself unduly to the propa-
gandizing of organized interests by virtue of the form or structure of the
statute. If the general public is especially vulnerable to misleading impres-
sions because of the way the statute, or contract, is written or put together,
we have at least a prima facie reason for preferring, from a public interest
standpoint, that the contract or statute be drafted in a way that tends to
discourage such propagandizing, even where the form or structure of the
contract resulted, along with its content in a narrower sense, from the un-
coerced bargaining of the organized interests.
B. "Tense" Statutes and the Production of Propaganda
In our context, propagandizing of the general public may be unduly
facilitated by a feature shared to a greater or lesser degree by any number
of government employment statutes. This feature may be referred to as
structural "tenseness." That a statute or contract is "tense" in this sense
does not at all mean that it is self-contradictory or in any degree ambigu-
ous. The opposite of a "tense" statute would instead be something like a
statute that is perspicuous, or that has structural integrity.
The tenseness in some or all typical government employment contracts
may arise from the tendency to rhetorically exalt and pay homage to the
notion of security from unjust or arbitrary employment termination in one
provision or passage, while quite clearly, unequivocally, and effectively es-
tablishing what might seem, in light of the foregoing provision, a dispropor-
tionately underdeveloped set of procedures to implement the laudable goal
of freedom from arbitrary dismissal.
As between the presumably competent, knowledgable contracting par-
ties, it may well be arbitrary to find any such disproportion between right
and procedure. The parties may have simply agreed to pay only lip service
to a particular set of values. But for the general public, uninvolved with the
drafting, there may be a clear difference between apparently giving certain
rights to employees, only to clearly take them largely away, and never in-
serting the largely rhetorical, largely unenforceable language of employee
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rights in the first place. The general public may ordinarily know only a part
of the story, as told, self-interestedly, by the organized, actively involved
groups. The public is less vulnerable to manipulation by its own legislative
agents, or by government employers, or by employees, when the statute or
contract clearly and perspicuously accords only limited employee proce-
dural rights, instead of a fanfare of largely rhetorical recognition, or appar-
ent recognition, of broader employee rights, where that recognition is then
undermined, especially where it may be in the perceived interest of legisla-
tors, employers, and employees, to trumpet the rhetoric, as opposed to the
narrower substance.
This is not to suggest that for ordinary citizens, substantive provisions
are clearer or inherently more prominent or visible than procedural provi-
sions. It is only to suggest that it is easier to propagandize where something
is apparently given but then, clearly, largely taken away than when it is
largely never granted in the first place. There is a recognizable public inter-
est in legislative silence, or modest speech, as opposed to extolling a value,
only to largely negate its achievement.
Such statutes are admittedly not self-contradictory or logically defec-
tive in any strict sense. But as Lon Fuller has noted, "[iut has been sug-
gested that instead of speaking of 'contradictions' in legal ... argument we
ought to speak of 'incompatibilities,' - of things that do not go together or
do not go together well."'"" However well the employment contract provi-
sions in our case go together for the directly involved parties, they may "not
go together well" from the perspective of the interests of the general public,
if they promote the possibility of manipulative political communications.
The problem is not precisely one of failure to disclose, or to conspicu-
ously disclose, or even lack of candor,"' in the sense that an unwary con-
sumer might be victimized by an inconspicuous disclaimer of a warranty,
since in our cases the statutory language affording only limited procedure
upon termination is assumed to be clear and prominent. However, neither
the apparent "give" nor the "takeaway" of employee rights are salient, for
the general public, until explicitly brought to the public's attention.
All directly affected interest groups, or even one of them alone, may
see an interest in calling the public's attention to the language of the appar-
ent "give," and not the "takeaway" or procedural language. Employers may
want to appear beneficient and progressive. Employee unions may want to
project an image of competence and effectiveness in securing express recog-
nition of their rights. Legislators may want to appear to have accomplished
something dramatic, or in accordance with the interests of employers or
117. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 69 (rev. ed. 1969). See also Diver, Statutory
Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 575-76 (1985).
118. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 87 (1974).
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employees. No interest group may, at least for a time, have a strong interest
in promoting a more balanced public understanding of the actual state of
affairs. The structure of "tense" statutes promotes this potentially unholy
alliance by entering the beneficent language of grant or recognition into the
statute, in an apparently serious way, only to have it seriously undercut, by
agreement, by another provision.
It is possible to attempt to legitimize this sort of format as one of sym-
bolism, or of merely hortatory language, but the costs and risks of this sort
of "tense" statute do not fall exclusively on the contracting parties. "Pla-
cebo actions do not merely have a nil effect. The removal of an issue from
the political agenda by the announcement of a placebo policy makes it diffi-
cult to get attention paid to arguments for more substantive policies." '1 9 In
the long run, the danger is that just as public cynicism may result if the
imputed and actual purposes of statutes vary too widely, 120 public cynicism
may result when and if the public realizes that its induced understanding of
a statute, or a program such as social security, is misleadingly sanguine.
Against this background, the observations of Professor Michelman
may take on some force, if they do not create a cause of action:
Arnett involved a statute which ... purported to protect tenured
public employees against dismissal except on certain enumerated
grounds, thus creating an entitlement; but . . . in the same
breath curtailed access to explanatory procedures in support of
the entitlement."2 '
We have assumed that this argument is ordinarily of little moment as be-
tween employers and employees, as contractual parties, who negotiated for
limited procedures. The argument gains force if they point to the statute's
undue manipulability.
To exhibit the "tenseness" detectable in many of our employment ter-
mination statutes or contracts, we might simplify them along the following
lines: "1. [Because of the vital importance of employment security,] all per-
manent or established or tenured employees may be dismissed only for lim-
ited, specified grounds. 2. [But] the procedural or process rights of such
employees in the event of dismissal are quite modest." Generalized, the
form becomes: "Because X is a vital interest, all A's are hereby entitled to
X. 2. The right to X is only weakly or insecurely enforceable."
119. B. HOGWOOD & B. Guy PETERS, THE PATHOLOGY OF PUBLIC POLICY 173 (1985).
But see Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 232 (1976).
120. See Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values,
92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1555 n.69 (1983).
121. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in XVIII
NoMos: DUE PROCESS 126, 133 (1977).
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Tense statutes may exist in several varieties. In the due process con-
text, Professor Monaghan raises, for other purposes, the possibility
that a state motor vehicle statute invested automobiles with all
the attributes of property as that term is generally understood,
but also provided that no person who bought a car after the stat-
ute was passed would be deemed to have a "right to continued"
ownership as against the state. 2
An obvious real-world instance of a tense statute's lending itself to in-
tense propagandizing on its substantive side, only to have the "takeaway"
provisions highlighted upon a due process challenge, is the social security
benefit case of Flemming v. Nestor.2' There, the Court pointed out that
the "escape clause" provisions of the statute clearly reserved the right to
diminish or divest what were often propagandized as somehow accrued or
entitlement-based, and obviously practically important, benefits.'2 4
An arguably more ambiguous or equivocal, 25 but still recognizably
tense, statute was litigated in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 126 in which a statutory "bill of rights" provision guaranteeing
the right of mentally retarded persons to appropriate treatment in the least
restrictive environment turned out to be largely unenforceable.2 7
Plainly, a largely unenforceable "bill of rights" may be contrary to the
public interest as lending itself to propagandizing, 28 even if the purported
122. Monaghan, Of"Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 440 (1977).
One would hope and expect that the price of the cars bought after the enactment would reflect
the reality that the state had in effect created a bailment at sufferance.
123. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
124. See id. at 610-11.
125. See Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpreta-
tion in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 892, 910 n.125 (1982).
126. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
127. Id. at 8! See also Laycock, Due Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort to
Make the Due Process Clauses Nonjusticiable, 60 TEX. L. REV. 875, 888 (1982)("legislative
fraud"); Terrell, Property and Due Process, 70 GEO. L.J. 861, 895 (1982)(focusing on the
analysis of Justice Brennan).
128. Cf. Articles 39 and 50 of the current Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, which rather tensely guarantee freedom of speech, with the clear, express, immedi-
ately attached limitation that such speech not be destructive of the development of the socialist
system or the interest of the state.
The later caveats of course are of a substantive, rather than procedural or enforcement-
process nature. The Soviet free speech clause is also of interest in showing that tenseness may
afflict "public interest," as opposed to merely private interest group legislation. See generally
Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16-17
(1984). As the Soviet free speech clause, Pennhurst, and Nestor illustrate, tenseness is often
not a matter of special interest legislation lurking behind a public interest facade. Cf. Macey,
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest
Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 232, 233 (1986).
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beneficiaries of such a provision view it favorably, as a symbolic first step in
eventual actual recognition of such rights.
This is not to suggest that the passage of merely hortatory or entirely
precatory legislation is invariably contrary to the public interest or always
deserves some judicial redress, problems of standing aside. 2 9 Even if the
courts were free to rewrite "tense" statutes or contracts, this authority
would not encompass statutes with no schizophrenic or ambivalent tenden-
cies. If employees, or mentally ill persons, or whomever, are to be accorded
no rights under a statute, that status can be established in ways other than
through undermining a proclaimed "bill of rights," language which in many
quarters is historically taken with some seriousness. If a statute is to be
hortatory, it can be drafted perspicuously to reflect that intent: "all else
equal, it would be splendid if employees could be utterly secure from unjust
or mistaken dismissal, and this ideal should be borne in mind."' 30
C. "Tense" Statutes and the Problem of Collective Action
Tense statutes impose costs, and the supply of tense statutes may be
excessive, if the costs of tense statutes are not fully internalized. 8' Interest
groups, as well as politicians, may speak through their statutes and con-
tracts as well as about them, and just as the supply of polluted air may
reflect the producers' failure to fully internalize such costs, so there may be
excessive amounts of "polluted speech'- 2 generated by our tense statutes,
flowing from the interest groups and legislators to the general public.
The essence of the problem is that non-tense or perspicuous statutes
are statutes that, in that "formal" or only broadly substantive respect, ben-
efit everyone in common, at a discernible but low level. That we are speak-
ing of the form of a statute in some sense does not immunize the non-tense
statutes from the truism that "[llaws that benefit the people in common are
hard to enact because no one can obtain very much of the benefit of lobby-
129. Cf. Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1195, 1259 (1982); Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85, 110 (P.
Kurland, G. Casper & D. Hutchinson eds. 1983)(reference to "vacuous entitlements").
130. While the problem of tenseness is not that of legislative candor, in that tense stat-
utes are often clear and unambiguous, without any obscurity, cloaking, or hidden purposes or
motives of a selfish sort, the susceptibility of tense statutes to propagandizing poses some
problems analogous to lack of candor. Cf. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 255
(1986).
131. See generally, e.g., Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L.J. 65, 105 (1983).
132. The term "polluted speech" is suggested by its use, in another context, by Professor
Bernard Williams, in ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 101 (1985).
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ing for or preserving such laws." " s
While ordinary citizens might, in the abstract, be inclined to together
pay for a clean, perspicuous, non-tense statute so as to reduce their own
vulnerability to political propagandizing, their costs of organizing will tend
to be high. As Judge Posner has observed with respect to organization costs,
"[als the group becomes larger and more diverse, these costs rise; at the
same time, the benefits to each member of the group become smaller or at
best remain constant."' 34
There will, therefore, be some tendency for the legislative process to
enhance the influence of discrete, well-organized groups, such as govern-
ment employers, government employee unions, or incumbent legislators
themselves, who may have a perceived interest in tense statutes, at the ex-
pense of the less well-organized general public, who may see "tenseness" in
statutory drafting as without benefit and as quite possibly costly. 35
The inability of the general public to organize to pay for or insist upon
non-tense statutes results, therefore, in the excessive production of tense
statutes, and in self-interested propagandizing of the general public by
groups seeking to highlight the recognition of substantive rights in the stat-
ute, as opposed to the modest procedures for enforcing those rights. This
result would accord with what a leading social scientist regards as a rela-
tively uncontroversial generalization: often, the statutory provisions "least
significant for resource allocation are most widely publicized.' 36
The logic of allowing some sort of judicial challenge to a "tense" gov-
ernment employment termination statute, even by an employee or union
who was unmistakably a party to the contract for modest procedures upon
dismissal is that publicity attending the judicial decision will tend to reduce
the cost to the public of discovering the more inclusive, thorough reading of
the statute, its proverbial bottom line.'8 7
There may thus be grounds for not invariably following the rule that"when an interest group bargain is explicit, courts should uphold the bar-
gain," 8 8 even if the objecting party can raise no standard contractual de-
fense, since there may be a systematic tendency for the legislators to under-
protect a public interest in non-tense drafting. Courts may choose to re-
write job termination procedures not merely to impose their own views of
133. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV.
4, 15 (1984). The classic source on the general point is M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1965). See also Macey, supra note 130, at 231 ("the classic 'free rider' problem").
134. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 263 (1985).
135. See generally, for the basic redistributive effect, Macey, supra note 130, at 230.
136. M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 26 (1964).
137. See Macey, supra note 130, at 256.
138. See id. at 239.
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fairness upon contracting parties,'39 but to discourage the underproduction
of a classic public good, the non-tense statute. While there are quite possi-
bly public purposes served by limited procedural rights for employees, 40
apart from the private reasons adopted by the parties in agreeing to such
procedural limitations, there are no obvious public interests served by the
imperspicuous, give-and-takeaway structure of tense statutes.
Assuming that statutory tenseness is found to present a justiciable is-
sue of public injury, and some party with standing can be identified, the
issue of remedy arises. Of course, having tense statutes struck down even
unpredictably, in unpredictable ways, may raise the price of tense drafting.
But there are two more systematic approaches to remedies issues. On the
first such approach, the courts might inquire into which party alone insisted
upon, or took the initiative in proposing, the largely symbolic language that
is largely negated in practice by the controlling procedural language, where
such procedural language had already been negotiated or was under discus-
sion. Such a party of course may not exist, or be identifiable judicially. The
basic point, however, would be to somehow penalize, as by striking down
the symbolic language, the party that "caused" the tenseness. This party
could be, again, either the dominant or the weaker party, for reasons of
their own, if such labels apply.
On the second such approach to remedies, the court might, if it can
detect a weaker and a stronger party, attempt to promote egalitarian val-
ues, while serving the public interest in improved drafting,' 4 ' by either ad-
ding strength and elaboration to the modest termination procedures agreed
upon by the parties, or striking the largely empty substantive language of
right, if it is thought that this would aid the weaker party, as by depriving
the dominant party of a propaganda weapon. It is of course equally possible
that the employees are collectively strong, but chose to make a minor con-
cession in agreeing to the largely symbolic language of right.
139. Cf. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533, 540 (1983)(concern
over judicial upsetting of the balance of compromise reflected in a statute). See also Stewart
& Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1195, 1259 (1982)(mod-
est procedures may have been a concession to obtain any substantive entitlement in the first
place).
140. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 139, at id.
141. Cf. Macey, supra note 130, at 233 (carefully ambiguous statutes run a greater risk
of judicial misinterpretation than more candid, but more facially objectionable statutes); R.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 268 (1985)(language intended to fool political opponents of
the interest groups may inadvertently fool the courts, thereby reducing the power of one or
more interest groups under the statute).
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IX. CONCLUSION
Granting the undesirability of statutes, or contracts embodied in stat-
utes, whose form or structure leads to increased political manipulation of
the broad public, or less political accountability, it is of course far from
obvious that citizens should be granted standing, as citizens, to seek judicial
relief from such broadly shared injuries, 142 or that a government employee
or union, as a party to the underlying, non-defective contract entered into
with the government employer, should be permitted to champion the rights
of citizens as a whole who are not before the court. A public interest ap-
proach is thus problematic at several points on the issue of standing.
The most tenable ground, then, for judicially enforcing the procedural
rights of dismissed governmental employees would be the traditional sorts
of contract defenses, including mutual mistake, frustration of purpose, and
perhaps unconscionability. Use of these vehicles alone might be said not to
modify the bargained-for rights of the parties, since they constitute a por-
tion of the legal framework within which all contracts are negotiated.
The overall conclusion must therefore be that the most cogent way of
overcoming the various criticisms of the Rehnquist approach to procedural
due process issues in our context is to reinterpret the Rehnquist approach
along contractualist lines, where contractual principles are applied as be-
tween the employing government and the employees or their union at the
legislative stage, or between the government employer and the individual
employee or prospective employee at the stage of the individual employment
contract. Results of litigated cases more in accord with the approach of the
current Supreme Court majority should be reached, generally, only where
the circumstances of the employee's dismissal were not within the bar-
gained contemplation of the parties, or where the parties have not reached a
legally defensible negotiated accomodation on termination procedures be-
cause of the presence of some traditional contract-based excuse or defense.
142. See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1195, 1259 & 1259 n.272 (1982).

